CC jdxb
Manage 节点小宝 (Node Baby Link / JDxB) remote access service on Linux. Install, start/stop/restart the systemd service, check status, view logs, get pairing codes, update, and uninstall. Triggers on mentions of 节点小宝, jdxb, node baby link, remote access proxy, or port 9118.
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:39Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -sL https://iepose.com/install.sh | sudo bash
Medium and low: 3
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:33Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo bash skills/jdxb/scripts/jdxb.sh install
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:39Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionscurl -sL https://iepose.com/install.sh | sudo bash
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processscripts/jdxb.sh:197Starts a background / autostarted processsystemctl enable "${APP_NAME}.service"
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 5 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 368 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 270: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.