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CC monolith

Secure crypto wallet for AI agents. Hardware-isolated keys (Apple Secure Enclave), ERC-4337 smart wallet, on-chain spending caps, default-deny policy engine.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: slavique v0.1.10 24 files body ≈ 1 137 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 13

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 13
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence lib/runtime-bootstrap.js:9
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    `${process.env.HOME}/Library/LaunchAgents/com.monolith.daemon.plist`,
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence lib/runtime-bootstrap.js:10
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    '/Library/LaunchAgents/com.monolith.daemon.plist',
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence lib/runtime-bootstrap.js:28
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    commands.push(`/bin/launchctl bootstrap ${domain} ${shellQuote(launchAgentPath)}`);
    code literal
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/constants.js:20
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    '0xA0…B48': { symbol: 'USDC', decimals: 6 },
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/constants.js:23
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    '0x83…913': { symbol: 'USDC', decimals: 6 },
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/constants.js:28
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const ENTRY_POINT = '0x00…032';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/constants.js:32
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    UNIVERSAL_ROUTER: '0x3f…FAD',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/constants.js:34
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    1: '0x61…21e',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/intent-builder.js:89
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    1: '0xA0…B48',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/intent-builder.js:90
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    8453: '0x83…913',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:23
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:85
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:200
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…CzX+oOPq…N14+GARU…vzg==",
    detector

Files scanned: 23. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 36 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1137 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -312 of 12 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 157: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed crypto-wallet skill that can move funds within configured policy limits, so users should treat it carefully but the artifacts are coherent with that purpose.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026