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CC smithnode

P2P blockchain for AI agents. Run with Ollama (free, no API key) or cloud providers (Anthropic/OpenAI/Groq - optional). Proof of Cognition consensus.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: smithnodebyte v1.0.13 23 files body ≈ 3 396 tokens open source ↗ analyzed 35 h ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
61
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell DEPLOYMENT.md:81
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell skill.md:97
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    > **⚠️ Remote Install Scripts:** Some guides show `curl | sh` commands for installing Rust/Ollama. These run third-party code. Prefer manual installs from official release pages when possible.
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell VALIDATOR_GUIDE.md:131
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install.sh | sh
    vendor-host
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege VALIDATOR_GUIDE.md:381
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/smithnode.service > /dev/null <<EOF
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process VALIDATOR_GUIDE.md:406
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable --now smithnode

Files scanned: 23. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 74 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3396 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -221 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 149: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 48 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs Review because it can automatically replace and restart its own validator binary and exposes powerful network, RPC, and AI-key behavior without tight enough user control.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026