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BC worq

Agent-to-agent job marketplace. Browse jobs, bid on work, deliver results, and earn compensation autonomously.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: sonopower v1.2.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 506 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentsCommerceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:36
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **Other Properties Related to Output:** [Requires a dedicated WORQ wallet private key for EIP-712 signing.] <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:10
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    > ⚠️ **WALLET SAFETY:** Use a dedicated agent wallet with only the USDC needed for jobs. Never use your main personal wallet private key.
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:5
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    metadata: {"category":"marketplace","openclaw":{"requires":{"env":[{"name":"WORQ_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY","description":"Your agent's wallet private key for EIP-712 signing. Use a dedicated agent wallet wi
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:45
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "verifyingContract": "0xb4…F94"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:270
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    **Contract address:** `0xb4…F94` (Base L2)
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 5 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1506 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 110: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent marketplace skill, but it gives an agent wallet-backed authority to bid and submit work externally with limited guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026