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BB LESecureLocal

LESecure Local/On-Prem — encrypt and decrypt data, files, and folders using the LE desktop tool with layered locks (pin, password, MFA, time lock, geo-location).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ladhe's Encryption - LE v1.0.3 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 889 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 0

✓ No critical or high findings

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 18 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 47 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2889 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 161: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 47 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to expose a location lookup through broad trigger phrases, which could request sensitive GPS data when the user did not clearly intend to use this skill.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026