SKILLEMALL.ai

BB ghost-mode

Browser-style incognito mode for your OpenClaw agent. Activate to pause all memory writes — when you deactivate, every trace of the session is securely scrubbed from logs, memory files, session transcripts, and search indexes. Like closing an incognito window: nothing persists. Any files or local outputs you independently create during the session remain untouched. Use when user says "ghost on", "ghost off", "incognito", "private mode", "privacy mode", or wants a conversation that leaves no persistent trace in agent memory.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: stelloxx v1.2.7 MIT-0 9 files · 1 script body ≈ 5 120 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, progress reporting

GeneratorAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 0

✓ No critical or high findings

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Browser-style incognito mode for your OpenClaw agent. Activate to … ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5120 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "optional"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "install"

Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5120 tokens
  • 100Steps. 45 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 529: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 6 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a privacy/ghost-session skill, but it can delete or alter session and memory data with unclear activation and safety boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026