SKILLEMALL.ai

DC openclaw2backup

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Criss_Su v1.0.1 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 043 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
43/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
71
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:128
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName "OpenClaw Backup" `
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:209
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:226
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:126
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (detector / deny-list definition)
    -Argument "-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File `"$PSScriptRoot\scripts\quic…ps1`""
    detector

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 74 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1043 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 29 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a backup and restore skill, but it needs review because it can handle sensitive wallet, memory, configuration, and workspace data while the referenced scripts are not included for inspection.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026