SKILLEMALL.ai

AD video-content-analyzer

Analyze video content by extracting keyframes, searching the web for references, storing results in Supabase, and publishing reports to Feishu Wiki. Supports single-video and batch (whole-directory) processing with category-grouped Wiki publishing. Use when a user wants to analyze one video or many videos at once and turn them into searchable documentation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: terrycarter1985 v1.1.0 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 573 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSupabaseMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (6) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      HEARTBEAT.md, IDENTITY.md, MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, USER.md
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:32
      Reads a .env file
      cp .env.example .env

    Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 15 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 573 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 359: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The video analyzer itself is mostly coherent, but the package also installs a broad, under-disclosed Lark/Feishu automation workspace with cloud write, permission, messaging, calendar, and long-running event capabilities.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 20 Jun 2026