FC polymarket-mean-reversion-pro
(no description)
As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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critical Secrets in code
secret-telegram-botmean_reversion.py:51Telegram bot token (quoted — discussed, not commanded)TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN = "8763…AHG…"
quoted
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlmean_reversion.py:88Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage",quoted
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 22 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 661 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.