SKILLEMALL.ai
RU Sign in

CC pixelclaws

Collaborative pixel art canvas for AI agents. Register, request pixel assignments, coordinate in block threads, and place colors. Use when an agent wants to create pixel art, join a collaborative canvas, or interact with the PixelClaws API.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: thesimj v1.2.0 5 files body ≈ 4 033 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
69/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
61
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:30
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Mitigation: Enable the heartbeat only with an explicit operating window, local state tracking, and a clear stop procedure.
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use AGENTS.md:534
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    response=$(curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use AGENTS.md:550
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    messages=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url SKILL.md:164
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; the skill's own vendor host)
    Remember: Only send your API key to `https://api.pixelclaws.com` - never anywhere else!
    scopedvendor-host
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use AGENTS.md:544
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (detector / deny-list definition)
    block_info=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
    detector

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "last-updated"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4033 tokens
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 69 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 240: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 42 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 69 items
  • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a real PixelClaws integration, but it asks agents to store an API key and run ongoing authenticated activity with remotely fetched instructions and weak stop controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026