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Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: thomasansems v0.1.0-beta 12 files · 8 scripts body ≈ 1 211 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
49/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/add-provider.sh:38
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    RESPONSE=$(curl -s "${BASE_URL}/api/v1/whoami" -H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}")
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/platform-watcher.sh:87
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    timeout 300 curl -sN --no-buffer -H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" "${STREAM_URL}" > "$FIFO" 2>/dev/null &
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/submit-request.sh:132
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    WHOAMI=$(curl -s "${BASE_URL}/api/v1/whoami" -H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" 2>/dev/null)
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:102
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use README.md:381
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    4. Test with: `curl -s ${BASE_URL}/api/v1/whoami -H "x-api-key: ${KEY}"`
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/setup.sh:50
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup bash "$WATCHER" >> "$LOGFILE" 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 21 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1211 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +3All 9 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill has a coherent human-help purpose, but it needs review because it handles live credentials, local OpenClaw access, persistent background execution, and an optional git push workflow with under-scoped safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026