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CB datahive-installer

Automates DataHive sign-in using a magic link workflow: requests the link, retrieves it from Gmail via gog, and opens it in a Chrome DevTools tab.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Maxim Tuleyko v0.1.0 MIT-0 7 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 913 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion

ProcedureGmailData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
67/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
63
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
55
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security scripts/1_install_prerequisites.sh:75
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)
    xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine "/Applications/Google Chrome.app" 2>/dev/null || true
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/1_install_prerequisites.sh:44
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/google-chrome.list > /dev/null
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/1_install_prerequisites.sh:47
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/1_install_prerequisites.sh:51
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /etc/opt/chrome/policies/managed/extensions.json > /dev/null << EOF
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/2_launch_chrome_supervisor.sh:97
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    if command -v setsid >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/2_launch_chrome_supervisor.sh:98
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    env CHROME_CMD="$CHROME_CMD" setsid bash -c "$SUPERVISOR_SCRIPT" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 < /dev/null &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/2_launch_chrome_supervisor.sh:101
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed; code comment)
    # macOS often lacks `setsid`, and `nohup` may fail in non-interactive sessions
    code literalcomment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/2_launch_chrome_supervisor.sh:106
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    disown "$SUP_PID" 2>/dev/null || true

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 913 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 146: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +3All 5 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears to automate DataHive login, but it also makes persistent, privileged Chrome changes and leaves a debuggable browser running in the background.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026