SKILLEMALL.ai

BC AGIRAILS Payments

Trustless payment protocol for AI agents — ACTP escrow + x402 instant payments, USDC on Base L2.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Unima3x v3.0.12 19 files · 1 script body ≈ 13 462 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:186
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Set the keystore password (testnet/mainnet only):

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 13462 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 42 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (AGIRAILS Payments) differs from the folder (agirails)
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 13462 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 203 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 37 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (11 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 96: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 66 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 203 items
  • +4Has examples (49 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s payment purpose is clear, but it gives agents real-money wallet authority with under-scoped autonomous payment and installation paths users should review carefully.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026