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ClawHub Agent Skills author: Vihang D v0.1.0 MIT-0 64 files body ≈ 1 648 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceGitHubYouTubeResearchInfrastructureMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Write WebSearch
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store vendor/bird-search/lib/cookies.js:103
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition)
    warnings.push('No Twitter cookies found in Chrome. Make sure you are logged into x.com in Chrome.');
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/sources/x_twitter.py:123
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token vendor/bird-search/lib/twitter-client-base.js:88
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    authorization: 'Bearer AAAA…uTs%3D1Z…TnA',
    quoted

Files scanned: 62. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 56 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1648 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 165: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 56 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This research skill is broadly aligned with its purpose, but it needs review because it can automatically use sensitive X/Twitter browser session cookies and broad local API-key configuration.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026