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CB nostrkey

Cryptographic identity SDK for AI agents — generate Nostr keypairs, sign events, encrypt messages, BIP-39 seed phrases, portable backup tokens. 69 tests, zero C dependencies.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: vveerrgg v0.3.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 2 823 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:60
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    > Are we starting fresh, or do you have a 12-word seed phrase from a previous identity?"
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:62
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    ### Step 2a -- New identity (if they say new/fresh/no seed phrase)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:86
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    > **My seed phrase (write this down NOW):**
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:89
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    > This seed phrase is the ONLY way to recover my identity if something goes wrong. Not the passphrase -- the seed phrase. Write it down on paper, or save it in a password manager, or put it in a safe.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:91
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    > If we lose this seed phrase, this identity is gone forever. No recovery, no reset, no support ticket. The math does not care.

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2823 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 174: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is purpose-aligned for Nostr identity management, but it asks agents to handle account-recovery secrets in chat and includes risky publishing and storage examples.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026