SKILLEMALL.ai

BC sense-memory

Sovereign persistence for AI agents — encrypted key-value memories and journal entries on Nostr relays

ClawHub Agent Skills author: vveerrgg v0.2.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 3 516 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentsPersonal productivityInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:33
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    2. **Generate your identity** — the NostrKey skill walks you through creating a keypair with a 12-word seed phrase backup
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:78
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    > "I need a Nostr identity before I can use memory. Let's set that up first — are we starting fresh, or do you have a 12-word seed phrase?"
    quoted

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 20 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Failures and branches. 7 branches
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3516 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 102: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed Nostr-backed memory skill; it carries real privacy risk, but its sensitive behavior matches its stated purpose.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026