SKILLEMALL.ai

AA multisage

Query Multisage for multi-expert AI answers from Claude, GPT, and Gemini. Use this skill whenever the user wants multiple AI perspectives on a question, says "ask multisage", "multisage this", "get expert opinions", wants a multi-AI consultation, or needs a well-rounded answer that considers different viewpoints. Also use for deep research queries that need comprehensive analysis from multiple AI providers in parallel.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: M Waleed Kadous v2.2.0 2 files body ≈ 1 527 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process A 80/100 · Runs to the end — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
A
80/100
Runs to the end
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 80/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 12 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1527 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 422: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill appears to do what it claims, but it can automatically look through local environment files for an API key and may send ordinary prompts to an external multi-AI service too broadly.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026