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BB model-verify-flagos

Verify the serving stack with a user-specified target model. Runs twice: first with FlagGems/FlagCX disabled (isolate model-specific errors), then with full multi-chip stack enabled. Diffs the two runs to pinpoint which layer caused any failure.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Flagos v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 515 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(*)
    allowed-tools: Bash(*) Read Edit Write Glob Grep WebSearch WebFetch AskUserQuestion

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "user-invokable"

Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 15 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1515 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 245: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill performs a coherent model-verification workflow, but it defaults to running code from user-supplied model repositories without a clear warning or opt-in.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026