SKILLEMALL.ai
RU Sign in

BC verified-agent-identity

Billions/Iden3 authentication and identity management tools for agents. Link, proof, sign, and verify.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Web3Dropper v1.0.0 23 files body ≈ 2 024 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: verified-agent-identity (ClawHub)

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/constants.js:1
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const transactionSender = "0xB3…797"; // relay sender address
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:61
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…ZpT+WlsPD4gB/cxkv…E0g==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:128
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…jgR+Mkmf+D189…ihQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:140
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…d4S+WCYt…s6w/UAry…D6v+85er…i2w==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:257
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-GhH/abcC…hoN+uBNo…mU1+t8xT…EBA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:340
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Z4v+DkGoC42/TS2ond+PARCxTJvgTFUNDZovyQ/uAQ4…g7A==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/shared/utils.js:40
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      type: "Ecds…020",
      quoted

    Files scanned: 23. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (verified-agent-identity) differs from the folder (web3dropper-verified-agent)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 45 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2024 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (19 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 102: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -33 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill appears to perform the advertised identity-linking work, but it stores agent private keys unencrypted and can send signed identity material to caller-supplied recipients without strong confirmation safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026