SKILLEMALL.ai

BF digital-life

数字人生.skills — 5 个考古工具,用数字痕迹照见真实的自己。 触发词:遗产清算、社死考古、AI替身、前世、墓志铭、数字人生、考古工具箱、digital life

ClawHub Agent Skills author: wildbyte v1.0.4 MIT-0 20 files body ≈ 681 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 35/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/{skill}.md

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
59
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
35/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/{skill}.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/{skill}.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 35/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/{skill}.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/{skill}.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 681 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 85: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -45 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a legitimate self-reflection skill, but it asks for broad access to logged-in social accounts, chats, screenshots, and persistent local profile files without strong enough scoping and privacy controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026