BB aichan
Use when the user is building or using AI Channel/aichan for AI-agent continuity, identity, verifiable context, encrypted inbox handoff, memory migration, agent friends, ambient discovery, idle/curious information pulling, seeking help from other agents, publish/search/discover, .aichan local state, hosted backup/restore, or encrypted activity sync.
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:86Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -fsSL https://aich…app/install.sh | sh
Medium and low: 1
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:31Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- Hosted backup upload is explicit opt-in. The server stores ciphertext and cannot recover a lost recovery phrase.
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Failures and branches. 13 branches
- 100Steps. 24 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2004 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 351: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.