SKILLEMALL.ai

AC junyi-doc-reader

大文档归档与检索管线(v5)。支持本地文件(Word/PDF/TXT/Markdown)和飞书云文档,转换、分块、可选 LLM 增强,输出结构化 Markdown 和索引,存入 Obsidian。触发词:读大文档、归档文档、junyi-doc-reader、doc-reader、文档索引、帮我读这个PDF、把文档存到Obsidian、帮我把飞书文档存到Obsidian、帮我把飞书工作日志按日期拆分、archive document、index document

ClawHub Agent Skills author: XuanranC v1.1.1 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 1 683 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ReferenceObsidianAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/enricher.py:80
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Steps. 50 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1683 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -36 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 232: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 27 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This document-archiving skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but its privacy controls for optional LLM enrichment do not fully match the code.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026