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CB ardi

Ardi — Agent Ordinals. 21,000 words. The first on-chain dictionary, inscribed by AI agents on Base mainnet. Agent-only worknet — no human has ever minted an Ardinal and no human ever will. Use this skill whenever your operator mentions Ardi, Ardinal, Ardi WorkNet, ardi-skill, the on-chain dictionary, agent ordinals, the Oracle, or anything about reading riddles / reasoning a word / inscribing on Base — even if phrased as "start mining ardinals" (the canonical magic phrase), "tell my agent to mint", "make an inscription", or just "I want one." Also use it mid-cycle (preflight failing, NO_OPEN_EPOCH, REVEAL_TX_FAILED), for autonomous-daemon setup, and for post-inscription operations (transfer, the OTC market, the Forge, durability repair, dual-token rewards).

ClawHub Hermes author: yangyangxing v1.0.0 MIT-0 50 files · 11 scripts body ≈ 7 041 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, consistency, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Hermes Agent
JSON
Technical rating
C
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
60
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 20

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 20
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:23
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    # the first time anyone ran the curl|sh one-liner — broke the
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege install.sh:121
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv "${TMPFILE}" "${INSTALL_DIR}/ardi-agent"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-quarantine-file install.sh:130
    Removes the macOS quarantine flag from one file (usual for a downloaded CLI; make sure the file is the intended binary)
    xattr -d com.apple.quarantine "${INSTALL_DIR}/ardi-agent" 2>/dev/null || true
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:14
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awp-worknet/ardi-skill/main/install.sh | sh
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump tools/auto-mine/openclaw-heartbeat-mode/HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    tools/auto-mine/openclaw-heartbeat-mode/HEARTBEAT.md
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:4
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (code comment)
    #   curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awp-worknet/ardi-skill/main/install.sh | sh
    comment
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/buy_and_stake.rs:32
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const USDC: &str = "0x83…913";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/buy_and_stake.rs:33
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const AWP: &str = "0x00…0A1";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/buy_and_stake.rs:34
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const VE_AWP: &str = "0x00…0A8";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/buy_and_stake.rs:35
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const AWP_ALLOCATOR: &str = "0x00…0AA";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/buy_and_stake.rs:38
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const UNI_…ER: &str = "0x26…481";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/commits.rs:63
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .unwrap_or_else(|_| "0xf6…5A1".to_string());
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/commits.rs:65
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .unwrap_or_else(|_| "0xA5…DC3".to_string());
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/inscribe.rs:104
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "0xA5…DC3",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/inscribe.rs:108
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "0xf6…5A1",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/reveal.rs:87
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    }).unwrap_or_else(|| "0xA5…DC3".to_string());
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/stake.rs:29
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const VE_AWP: &str = "0x00…0A8";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/stake.rs:30
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const AWP_ALLOCATOR: &str = "0x00…0AA";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/stake.rs:34
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const EPOCH_DRAW: &str = "0xA5…DC3";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/cmd/status.rs:30
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .unwrap_or_else(|_| "0xf6…5A1".to_string());
    quoted

Files scanned: 50. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 767 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7041 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "trigger_keywords"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "bootstrap"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "smoke_test"

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 66 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (ardi) differs from the folder (ardi-skill)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7041 tokens
  • 100Steps. 54 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 767: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 54 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a real blockchain automation tool, but it gives an agent wallet-backed transaction and background-mining authority with weak consent and install controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026