SKILLEMALL.ai

AC trilium-etapi

Use when interacting with a Trilium Notes server via the ETAPI REST API - creating, reading, updating, searching, or deleting notes, branches, attributes, attachments, day/week/month notes; obtaining auth tokens; or scripting Trilium operations from the shell. Triggers on mentions of Trilium, ETAPI, noteId, branchId, or any /etapi/ URL.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yanickxia v0.0.1 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 2 056 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:80
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "$TRILIUM_URL/etapi/app-info" -H "Authorization: $TRILIUM_TOKEN" | jq

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 19 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2056 tokens
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 338: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a documentation-only Trilium ETAPI helper that explains legitimate note-management API operations, including powerful actions that users should run carefully.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026