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BC yidun-skill-sec

Intelligent code security scanner with hybrid local-cloud detection. Fingerprints packages, runs static behavioral analysis, and consults cloud threat intelligence (enabled by default, can be disabled) for confidence scoring.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Yidun v1.0.1 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 8 461 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, execution cost

AnalyzerSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
55
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:79
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `PRIV_ESCALATION` | `sudo`, `chmod 777`, `setuid` patterns |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.zh-CN.md:79
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `PRIV_ESCALATION` | `sudo`、`chmod 777`、`setuid` 等提权操作 |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:198
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `PRIV_ESCALATION` | `sudo`, `chmod 777`, `setuid` patterns | +30 |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:293
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo invocations|chmod with world-writable bits|chown to root|setuid patterns
    security skill
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:351
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (documentation table row)
    | Inline secrets | `api_key = "sk-a…456"` | `api_key = [REDACTED]` |
    table

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8461 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8461 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (19 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -219 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 225: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 55.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent security scanner, but its default cloud upload and unclear server-side retention deserve user review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026