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BD diary-force

每晚 23:00 自动催日记 + 思维模型分析 + 内化记忆。**强制型习惯养成工具**，适合有写日记习惯但经常拖延的人。包含 6 种思维模型深度分析，将日常经历转化为结构化认知。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: zylorra v2.0.0 6 files body ≈ 1 189 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/diary_force.py:458
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system('git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {}" && git push'.format(date))
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/diary_force.py:491
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system(f'git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {date}" && git push')
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/think.py:126
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system('git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {}" && git push'.format(date))

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (git, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 43 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1189 tokens
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • medium 5 test cases, all positive: not one "should refuse" or "should ask first"
  • low No test case covers injection arriving through data

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 90: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 26 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 43 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This diary skill is mostly transparent about saving, analyzing, and archiving journals, but it can automatically push very personal diary and memory files through Git with weak scoping and consent controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026