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DD devops-platform-skill

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: yuanqiuqian v1.0.0 MIT-0 14 files · 1 script body ≈ 609 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
47/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:8
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp -r devops-platform-skill /opt/homebrew/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:141
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod +x bin/devops-platform.js
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege setup.sh:102
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp -r "$(pwd)" "$OPENCLAW_SKILLS_DIR/devops-platform-skill"
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:46
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…IEY+unGH…OEl+Vssh…N5g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:94
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:131
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FSj+bWLt…2sH/Kn8E…h6w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:257
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…SDq+2kAA…MOe/+5cdoEdg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:324
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Loy/Rxalv2kr+lqMlUnrDWV+3j4p…IHu+HtC7…g8A==",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege setup.sh:112
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "   请手动复制: sudo cp -r $(pwd) /path/to/openclaw/skills/"
    code literal

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 34 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 609 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This DevOps CLI does what it says, but it handles access tokens and operational data in ways users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026