SKILLEMALL.ai

DF agent-expression

Local meme/sticker pack for chat agents: search by mood (vector+FTS), vision ingest, emit real absolute image paths only. Never invent paths or ls|shuf. On Cursor: open_resource(file:///…) to preview in editor (not MEDIA:/ chat bubbles). On Hermes: MEDIA:/path. Use when sending/previewing stickers or ingesting user images.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: yyh-001 v2.1.1 MIT-0 24 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 633 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 25 h ago

Local meme/sticker pack for chat agents: search by mood (vector+FTS), vision ingest, emit real absolute image paths only.

As a process F 33/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: .env.example

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
55/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
38
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
33/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: .env.example
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:73
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL …/install.sh | bash -s -- --project
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:74
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL …/install.sh | bash -s -- --cursor
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:36
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yyh-001/agent-expression/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:39
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yyh-001/agent-expression/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:53
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yyh-001/agent-expression/main/install.sh | bash -s -- --hermes
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:80
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File $env:TEMP\ae-i…ps1 -Project
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:81
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File $env:TEMP\ae-i…ps1 -Cursor
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:4
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (code comment)
    #     curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yyh-001/agent-expression/main/install.sh | bash
    comment

Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: .env.example

Process rating: all ten parameters 33/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: .env.example
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: .env.example
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 633 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 324: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill mostly matches its meme-pack purpose, but it deserves review because it can modify multiple agent installations and can send local images or captions to external APIs using ambient credentials.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 22 Jul 2026