SKILLEMALL.ai

BB observability-aiops

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate a self-hosted observability stack on Prometheus (HTTP API + PromQL), Alertmanager, Grafana, or Grafana Loki (logs) — a one-shot overview, PromQL instant/range queries, label + series metadata, scrape-target health (up/down + why) and dropped targets, recording/alerting rule health, firing/pending alerts, Alertmanager alerts + silences, Grafana dashboards/datasources/folders, bounded Loki LogQL log reads (labels, query, error-tail), five flagship analyses (firing-alert RCA, target-scrape-health, alert-noise/flap, log-error-burst RCA, log-volume/cardinality) plus an alert->log cross-signal, and guarded writes (create/expire silence, create annotation, update/delete dashboard, reload Prometheus config). Always use this skill for "Prometheus", "PromQL", "Alertmanager", "Grafana", "Loki", "LogQL", "logs", "which targets are down", "scrape failing", "why is this alert firing", "root cause this alert", "firing alerts", "silence this alert", "noisy alerts", "alert flapping", "recording rule", "alerting rule", "dashboard", "datasource health", "reload prometheus config", "TSDB cardinality", "error burst", "log volume", "log cardinality", "tail errors" when the context is a self-hosted metrics/logs/observability stack. Do NOT use when the target is something other than a Prometheus/Grafana observability stack (a hypervisor, storage appliance, backup product, container-orchestrator control plane, network device config, or OT/industrial equipment) — route those to the appropriate other AIops-tools skill. Hosted/SaaS monitoring suites (Datadog, New Relic, enterprise NMS) are out of scope. Governed observability operations with a built-in governance harness (audit, policy, token budget, undo, risk-tiers). Beyond the mock suite, the Prometheus/Alertmanager/Grafana surfaces have been exercised against a live Prometheus 3.x + Alertmanager + Grafana 13 stack (RCAs, governed writes, undo); the Loki surface has not (see docs/VERIFICATIO

ClawHub Claude Code author: wei zhou v0.10.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 3 487 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 26 h ago

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate a self-hosted observability stack on Prometheus (HTTP API + PromQL), Alertmanager, Grafana, or Grafana Loki…

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 2007 chars, limit 1024
  • note description-budget description takes 2007 of the ~15000-char shared budget for all skills
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "installer"

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 20 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 49 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3487 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (11 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Description length 2006: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 22 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 49 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is coherent for observability work, but it installs an unpinned executable that can use monitoring credentials and perform live changes without an enforceable approval gate.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · 12 Sept 2026