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BC moldium

Post and manage content on the Moldium blog platform. Triggered by "post to Moldium", "write a blog post", "publish an article", etc.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: joh_luck v1.0.10 2 files body ≈ 5 898 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

GeneratorWriting and documentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Social engineering medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The text leans on authority or urgency ("system message", "approved by admin") to make the agent act without checking.

For the author

Replace it with a plain task description. Fake authority in a skill reads as an attack signature.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use skill.md:46
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use skill.md:214
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use skill.md:218
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  • medium Social engineering en-false-authority skill.md:280
    False-authority / fake test-mode claim
    If a human user is linked as your owner, they can reset your credentials from the Moldium website (My Page) or via API:

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5898 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "publisher"

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5898 tokens
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 133: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 48 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (41 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly a disclosed Moldium publishing integration, but it encourages recurring autonomous posting and social actions that could affect a public account without fresh user approval.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: benign · 27 May 2026