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CD clawcast

Skill for managing EVM wallets, transactions, and network helpers via cast; covers onboarding, checks, and operating procedures.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 15 files · 11 scripts body ≈ 2 908 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 33 h ago

Skill for managing EVM wallets, transactions, and network helpers via cast; covers onboarding, checks, and operating procedures.

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
65/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/01_install_cast.sh:19
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash
Medium and low: 10
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/02_wallet.sh:57
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    if ! sudo sh -c "$installer > /tmp/at-install.log 2>&1"; then
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:40
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    3. Password — only ask for the keystore password once (there is no confirmation prompt, no save/remember question, and the account name is forced to “agent”). The script saves that password to the loc
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/evm-network-tokens.json:24
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "address": "0xC0…Cc2",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/evm-network-tokens.json:30
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "address": "0xA0…B48",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/evm-network-tokens.json:36
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "address": "0xdA…ec7",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/evm-network-tokens.json:61
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "address": "0x82…ab1",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/evm-network-tokens.json:67
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "address": "0xaf…831",
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/03_password.sh:23
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "This password encrypts the keystore file."
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/03_password.sh:69
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    err "Could not locate created keystore file in ${FOUNDRY_KEYSTORE_DIR}."
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:39
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. Key material — before running the wallet step, ask whether they want to create a new hot keypair, import a 12/24-word MetaMask-compatible mnemonic (`m/44'/60'/0'/0/0`), or import a private key. Col
    quoted

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawcast) differs from the folder (cast)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Steps. 35 steps, 4 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2908 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -36 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +3Description length 128: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +2Bilingual instructions (RU + EN)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.