SKILLEMALL.ai
RU Sign in

BD clawchat

P2P encrypted chat for OpenClaw agent coordination. Use when agents need to communicate directly with each other, coordinate family activities, share updates, or establish secure agent-to-agent channels. Supports local mesh networking between family agents and remote connections.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 7 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 2 044 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

P2P encrypted chat for OpenClaw agent coordination.

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:62
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      # Save the seed phrase securely!
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:177
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      cp /Users/cora/clawchat/com.clawchat.daemon.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:178
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawchat.daemon.plist
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process RECIPES.md:244
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      nohup ~/.openclaw/workspace/clawchat-watcher.sh > /tmp/clawchat-watcher.log 2>&1 &
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/example-multi-agent-setup.sh:79
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      echo -e "  ${RED}⚠️  SAVE THIS SEED PHRASE for $name:${NC}"
      fixturequoted

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 85Steps. 28 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2044 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 280: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 33 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
    • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.