BB deai-marketplace
Connects an AI agent to the DeAI decentralized asset auction marketplace on Base (https://deai.au). Provides shell scripts for: registering as an agent, browsing active auctions, bidding on English auctions, instant Buy-It-Now purchases, creating auctions to sell tokenized assets (ERC-20, ERC-721, ERC-1155, ERC-4626), settling expired auctions, cancelling listings, checking reputation and trade history, and approving payment tokens. Use when the user mentions: DeAI, asset auction, on-chain auction, bid, buy now, settle auction, create auction, agent registration, reputation, or Base marketplace.
Connects an AI agent to the DeAI decentralized asset auction marketplace on Base (https://deai.au). Provides shell scripts for: registering as an agent…
As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 7
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 7
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:169Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `DEAI_PASSWORD_FILE` — Path to keystore password file (for autonomous signing without prompts)
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreference.md:13High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| AssetAuction | `0x6c…38C` | `DEAI_ASSET_AUCTION_ADDR` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreference.md:14High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| Escrow | `0xEC…8d5` | `DEAI_ESCROW_ADDR` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreference.md:15High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| ERC8…ter | `0xf6…F4A` | `DEAI_IDENTITY_ADDR` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreference.md:16High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| ERC8…ter | `0xeC…A1c` | `DEAI_REPUTATION_ADDR` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreference.md:17High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| Endorsement | `0xB4…167` | `DEAI_ENDORSEMENT_ADDR` |
table
Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 34 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2304 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 602: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.