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AB m3u8-downloader

Download encrypted m3u8/HLS videos using parallel downloads. Use when given an m3u8 URL to download a video, especially encrypted HLS streams with AES-128.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 2 files · 1 script body ≈ 844 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Download encrypted m3u8/HLS videos using parallel downloads.

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, progress reporting

ProcedureMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/download.sh:67
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -sL "$KEY_URL" -o enc.key

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 5 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 844 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 155: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.