AB solo-index-youtube
Index YouTube channel videos and transcripts for semantic search. Use when user says "index YouTube", "add YouTube channel", "update video index", or "index transcripts". Works with solograph MCP (if available) or standalone via yt-dlp.
Index YouTube channel videos and transcripts for semantic search.
As a process B 77/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Glob Grep Write AskUserQuestion mcp__solograph__source_search mcp__solograph__source_list mcp__solograph__source_tags mcp__solograph__source_related
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medium Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeSKILL.md:151Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)**Fix:** Reduce `-n` limit, add `--sleep-interval 2` to yt-dlp commands, or use `--cookies-from-browser chrome` for authenticated access.
quoted
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 77/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 16 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1085 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 236: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.