SKILLEMALL.ai

BC video-transcript

Reach for this when a video needs to become text: a pasted YouTube link or ID, a transcribe/summarize/translate request, mining a video for facts, or a bare URL shared with 'what does this say?'. Skip it for uploads and account chores.

ClawHub Hermes author: artemchuikin v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 1 080 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceYouTubeMedia and videoWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-requests-env-secret SKILL.md:1
    Skill asks the runtime to inject credential env vars into its sandbox: TRANSCRIPTOUT_API_KEY — verify each one is needed for the stated purpose
    required_environment_variables: TRANSCRIPTOUT_API_KEY

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 235 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "required_environment_variables"

Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Consistency. The Hermes dialect needs category and tags
  • 100Steps. 4 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1080 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 235: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill has a coherent transcript purpose, but its setup asks the agent to handle account signup, OTP-based authentication, raw API keys, and persistent secret storage in ways users should review carefully.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 23 Aug 2026