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BC mission-control

Integrate with Mission Control dashboard to report task progress, publish documents to the Library, request approvals, and submit project requests. Use this skill whenever you start, complete, or fail a task, need human approval, want to publish research/reports/documentation, or need to submit a new project request. This skill provides the HTTP endpoints and event formats for communicating with the Mission Control backend.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: louisval1 v1.1.2 MIT-0 64 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 561 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationDockerData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell setup.sh:124
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
      warn "Install OpenClaw: curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash"
      code literal
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv docs/DOCKER.md:38
      Reads a .env file
      cp backend/.env.example backend/.env
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:173
      Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      3. Verify all configuration with: `cat backend/.env` and `cat ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 64. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (mission-control) differs from the folder (tsu-mission-control)
    • 70Failures and branches. 12 branches
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4561 tokens
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 44 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -47 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 427: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 44 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items
    • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a real Mission Control dashboard skill, but it installs persistent hooks and ships broad automatic reporting with insecure default access controls that users should review before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026