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AC sanmar

Deterministic SanMar API toolkit — wraps SanMar's SOAP web services and PromoStandards order-shipment service behind typed CLI tools. Search products, check real-time warehouse inventory, pull customer-specific (myPrice) pricing, validate carts, submit and track purchase orders, parse PO PDFs, and resolve marketing color names to SanMar mainframe color codes. Use whenever the user needs to read from or write to SanMar for apparel sourcing, pricing, ordering, or order tracking.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: zmtucker v0.1.0 MIT-0 15 files body ≈ 2 142 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 19 h ago

Deterministic SanMar API toolkit — wraps SanMar's SOAP web services and PromoStandards order-shipment service behind typed CLI tools.

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationProcurementLogistics and warehouseSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/ftp_feeds.md:6
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - `SanM…v18 (4).pdf`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "emoji"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 28 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2142 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -36 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 481: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 6)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill does what it claims for SanMar ordering, but it can expose SanMar credentials through normal tool inputs and purchase-order preview/output.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 17 Jun 2026