SKILLEMALL.ai
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BC mission-control

Kanban-style task management dashboard for AI assistants. Manage tasks via CLI or dashboard UI. Use when user mentions tasks, kanban, task board, mission control, or wants to track work items with status columns (backlog, in progress, review, done).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: rdsthomas v2.3.1 21 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 1 628 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationGitHubData and analyticsInfrastructureOperations and projectstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url docs/gateway-setup.md:73
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (documentation table row)
      | `your-site.github.io` | `https://remote.ngrok.app` | ✅ **Yes** |
      table
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host docs/PREREQUISITES.md:18
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/PREREQUISITES.md:88
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg | sudo dd of=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/PREREQUISITES.md:89
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.lis
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url docs/gateway-setup.md:14
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      | **Remote (ngrok)** | `https://your-subdomain.ngrok.app` | Via `ngrok http 18789` |
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 35 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1628 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -32 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 249: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 4)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This task-board skill is not clearly malicious, but it handles powerful GitHub and local-agent access in ways users should review carefully before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026